A blog intended to promote thoughtful discussion about the UN.
108th Congress, H. Res. 869
Legislation [H.Res.869] was introduced by Rep. Roger Wicker (R-MS) and cosponsored by 59 other members in the latter part of the 108th Congress that sought to put the U.S. House of Representatives on record as supporting the resignation of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan because of the allegations against the Oil-for-Food Program (OFFP). Many of the "facts" used in the preamble to the legislation are not accurate or do not tell the whole truth.
1. "Whereas under the supervision of the United Nations, Saddam Hussein illicitly accumulated over $21 billion through the Oil for Food program and U.N. Sanctions."
This claim greatly exaggerates the magnitude of the Oil-for-Food problems and also inaccurately suggests that all of the illicit revenue received by the Hussein regime came from the Oil-for-Food Program.
Thus far four investigations have confirmed that illicit trade with Iraq's neighbors and oil smuggling were responsible for far more of Hussein's illicit revenue than the Oil-for-Food Program. Notably, revenue linked to OFFP comprises just a small percentage of the alleged $21 billion first cited by the Senate Subcommittee on Permanent Investigations chaired by Senator Norm Coleman (R-MN). Only about $6.5 billion is attributable to potential abuses in the Oil-for-Food Program. This is certainly a serious problem on its own. But the largest share of the money, $13.6 billion, was attributed to oil smuggling by subcommittee investigators (see chart).
Additionally, the report of the Iraq Survey Group (Duelfer report) cites that as much as ¾ of the illicit funds came from oil smuggling. That investigation attributed only $1.7 billion to OFFP (see chart). A third source, a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, concluded Saddam Hussein likely embezzled $4.4 billion through pricing irregularities in connection with OFFP. However, the GAO found an additional $5.7 billion was the result of illegal oil smuggling. Finally, Paul Volcker, head of the Independent Inquiry Committee, said in a November 24, 2004 Charlie Rose interview: "Most of that 21 billion, most of that $10 billion, most of whatever the final number is was the smuggling, not the Oil-for-Food Program."
It is important to make this distinction because the UN was not responsible for oversight of oil smuggling. The U.S., UK and other Security Council members were aware of many of these activities and did little to stop them. By alleging that all of the illicit revenue obtained by Saddam Hussein during the sanctions was from Oil-for-Food, the legislation places the responsibility for Saddam's illicit revenue on the doorstep of the UN and its Secretary-General Kofi Annan when, in fact, most of the money came through channels over which the UN had no oversight.
The responsibility for guarding against oil smuggling was clearly assigned to UN member states, and in the Gulf area, to the Multinational Interception Force (MIF). Thus, it is wrong to charge or imply that the UN was solely responsible for Saddam's illicit activities, because the UN clearly did not have oversight responsibility for more than half of the illicit revenue Saddam is alleged to have acquired.
2. "Whereas the United Nations refuses to hand over any of the 55-internal audits of the Oil for Food program produced by the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight"
The Independent Inquiry Committee (IIC), headed by Paul Volcker, released to the public and the U.S. Congress 58 internal audits that had been conducted into the Oil-for-Food Program. The internal audits show that OFFP was a heavily monitored program and that 88% or 157 of 179 critical audit recommendations were implemented by the UN. While the audits raise some deficiencies in the oversight of the program, Volcker has stated publicly that the audits do not include any "flaming red flags."
Per its policy of providing the IIC all relevant documents related to the program, the IIC had the audits in its possession since its creation. In a November 16, 2004 letter to Senators Coleman and Levin, Mr. Volcker said that the audits and other evidence would be made public once the IIC finished its work with them. Volcker's letter goes on to explain "the policies of our Committee are designed to reconcile essential and desirable transparency and disclosure in our work with the need to conduct our investigation with the degree of confidentiality and simple fairness necessary... The stated policy of the Committee, consistent with these understandings, is that our reports and findings will be accompanied by disclosure of all evidence bearing on those findings… We anticipate these disclosures will include the documentary evidence explicitly mentioned in the Senate letter, certainly including the internal (and external) audit reports."
3. "Whereas the Oil for Food program, since inception, has been under the direction and supervision of Secretary-General Kofi Annan."
This assertion is misleading because the UN Security Council approved the establishment of and structure for the Oil-for-Food Program, and its 661 Committee- on which the U.S. had a seat at all times- was responsible for approving contracts under the program.
Comprehensive sanctions were placed on Iraq following the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 (Resolution 661). However, soon after the end of the Gulf War in 1991, there were growing concerns in the international community about the effect of the sanctions on the Iraqi people. In order to address growing humanitarian necessities and maintain support for the sanctions, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted resolutions 706 and 712 in 1991, allowing Iraq to sell a portion of its oil to meet these needs. The Government of Iraq, however, declined these offers.
In April 1995, the Security Council passed Resolution 986, establishing the Oil-for-Food Program, giving the Iraqi government another chance to fund humanitarian goods and activities through oil sales. Following an agreement with the Government of Iraqi in May 1996, the first Iraqi oil was exported under the program in December 1996 and the first humanitarian goods arrived in March 1997.
Oversight for Oil-for Food rested on the UN Security Council and the UN Secretariat's Office of the Iraq Program (OIP). The Office of the Iraq Programme was responsible for the overall management and coordination of all United Nations humanitarian activities in Iraq under Resolutions 661 and 986.
However, the Security Council's 661 Committee had the responsibility to approve all contracts awarded under the Oil-for-Food Program. The U.S., through its permanent seat on the UN Security Council, had a representative on the 661 Committee during the entire duration of the Oil-for-Food Program. On many occasions, the UNSC approved contracts despite the OIP personnel having raised concerns about potential overpricing and other irregularities in the contracts. For instance, between 2001 and 2002, the OIP flagged at least 70 contracts for potential overpricing, but the UNSC approved each contract. (View examples of contracts flagged by OIP over pricing concerns.)
The Security Council authorized a six month phase-out of OFFP in May 2003 following the lifting of civilian sanctions. The program terminated in November 2003 and all remaining activities were transferred to the administration of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).
4. "Whereas the Iraq Survey Group reported that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein attempted to bribe members of the U.N. Security Council through the Oil for Food program"
"Whereas the Iraq Survey Group indicated that Saddam Hussein bribed Kofi Annan's personally appointed Executive Director of the Oil for Food Oversight Agency, Benon Sevan"
The allegations that UN officials might have acted improperly have been taken very seriously by the United Nations. This is one of the main issues that the IIC is examining. The UN Secretary General has said that all UN personnel should cooperate with the investigation or face dismissal. It is important to note, however, that the Iraq Survey Group report was not specifically looking at the Oil-for-Food Program, as its director Charles Duelfer testified repeatedly before the House International Relations Committee during a November 17, 2004 hearing.
5. "Whereas it is crucial for the international community to have confidence that operations under the authority of the United Nations are executed in a responsible and credible manner"
The international community has demonstrated strong confidence in the UN. In fact, when some in the American government called for the resignation of the Secretary-General, virtually the whole world mobilized to repudiate those assertions and support Mr. Annan. Since the introduction of this resolution, the international community has also rallied around the UN to coordinate international relief efforts to the tsunami disaster in Asia, demonstrating that the world understands the need and has strong confidence in the UN.